What the paper below is about

The entry below is a paper that I recently wrote for an economics class at Sonoma State University. It gives a balanced analysis of the American Revolution by focusing on the perspectives of America and Great Britain. It focus specifically on the Stamp Act and the Townshend Acts and their impact or influence rather on the forces that led to the Revolt of the 13 colonies.
Enjoy!

Economic Influences that Led to the American Revolution

Over the past 200 years many academics, historians and authors have taken on the task of reporting and interpreting the American Revolution. There are hundreds possibly thousands of books that have been written in an attempt to shed light on the birth of our country. The task over the next several pages is to answer the question, “Did the acts of the British Parliament lead to, in part or in whole, the complete revolt of the American colonies?” A few select events and acts of Parliament in the years and months prior to the Revolutionary War will be examined and analyzed to provide an economic interpretation of them. I am of the opinion that these economic issues were of primary cause to the American Revolution.

Anytime a sufficient study of the American Revolution is embarked upon, it is necessary to look to the time period that led up to the advertised year of 1776 that has been labeled as the year of America’s birth. The war for independence didn’t happen all at once but rather was a culmination of events of the ten or more years prior to the actual war. Colonists in 1776 did not all of the sudden decide it was time to revolt but reacted to years of building frustration with their mother country. Andrews seconds this statement about revolutions, “They [revolutions] are the resultants of a vast complex economic, political, social, and legal forces…They are never sudden in their origin, but look back to influences long in the making.” (Andrews 1926)

Most often the Revolutionary war is thought of by Americans from the perspective of the colonists during this period, but it seems logical to put aside patriotic barriers and look, for a time, at the events of the late eighteenth century from the perspective of Great Britain, the infamous mother country to the American Colonies.

At the middle of the eighteenth century Great Britain was the super power of the world. Their navy was second to none, which at that time fueled their ability to maintain a status of superiority. Britain had also established it’s dominance through victories over countries such as France in the America’s. The strength of her economy, another major contributor to her greatness, was the product of a successful mercantilist system based on the production of raw goods, the manufacturing of those goods and finally the sale of those goods to virtually every part of the world. Britain, acting in its self interest, had established for itself an ownership of what we would call today outsourcing. England set up in the new world an extension of itself. It had laid claim to the east coast of the modern day United States, fought for it against many enemies and had come out on top. In this new world, under the rule of England, the thirteen colonies were established. The purpose of the colonies developed into producing raw materials and harboring trade for Great Britain. As time progressed the colonies grew and matured into the major support of the entire English mercantilist economy.

For many reasons, a few of which will be presented and analyzed in this paper, the colonists, who had come to call themselves “Americans”, became dissatisfied with the oversight of the crown of England and overthrew her and won their independence through brute force in 1776. Because of this Great Britain lost her most prized possession and thus faded from the list of world super powers.

These events call us to question how the greatest country in the world could lose its most valuable asset. What offenses did they commit that could possibly lead to such a devastating outcome? These are the questions I will attempt to answer over the next few pages specifically though the analysis of the Stamp and Townsend acts. We will begin with the Stamp act.

In March of 1765 the British Parliament, under the oversight of the Grenville ministry, passed what came to be known as the Stamp Act despite warnings from American colonial legislature agents. The act set out to levy taxes on newspapers, newspaper advertising, playing cards and dice, and a vast array of documents. The Stamp Act levied these taxes by requiring that almost every paper product in the colonies be produced on a special stamped paper which came only from England. It was estimated that this act would raise upwards of 60,000 pounds annually in revenue for the British government. By May of the same year distributors were put in place and this special stamped paper was shipped to America for distribution and sale. It was decided that the Stamp Act would come into effect in November of the same year.

The passage of the Stamp act was followed by a massive uproar of rejection in the colonies and was nullified in all 13 colonies except for Georgia. The Virginia House of Burgesses decided that only the Virginia assembly could make the decision whether or not to tax Virginians. As Berg notes, this was “a principle that received widespread approval as copies of the resolves circulated throughout the colonies” (Berg 2001). A driving factor of the nullification was that “the distributors were forced by threats of violence to resign, and the colonists proceeded to use unstamped paper for newspapers and other articles in defiance of the act” (Knollenberg 1975). Other reactions in opposition to the Stamp Act included merchants in the colonies ordering British goods on the condition that the act be repealed. Almost a thousand American merchants sign non-importation agreements in an effort to boycott British goods. In some places the act even drew acts of violence. In Boston angry protestors attacked the homes of the lieutenant governor and stamp master and went as far as to hang the stamp master in public view from what would later be named the Liberty Tree. Instances similar to this occurred in Newport, Rhode Island and Connecticut. As identified by Berg, “This intimidation inherent in such protests persuaded tax masters in most of the colonies to abandon their appointments and duties” (Berg 2001).

The Stamp Act was not only met with merchant opposition in the shipyards but also faced some diplomatic reactions. The intercolonial Stamp Act Congress at New York as proposed by Massachusetts formed. After convening for almost the entire month of October they sent a petition to the House of Commons “denying the right of Parliament to tax the colonies for revenue” (Knollenberg 1975). Berg agrees with Knollenberg to the extent that the congress was formed and a petition was sent but elaborates further as to the contents of the petition. Berg states as the contents of the petition that “the congress recognized the right of king and Parliament to govern the American colonies and to regulate their commerce but asserted that taxes could be imposed on the colonists only with their consent” (Berg 2001). Although William Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, spoke in support of the petition, the ministry ignored his argument and voted not to receive the petition. It’s interesting to note here that the colonies did not deny the right of Britain to tax them but only felt that taxation for the purpose of raising revenue was inappropriate.

American colonists were not the only ones to negatively respond to the Stamp Act. British merchants begged of Parliament to repeal the Stamp Act because of its negative effect. They feared a loss of trade due to the American merchant’s boycott of British exports and were concerned that they would not be able to collect debts owed to them by persons in the North American British Territories.

On February 3^rd the repeal of the Stamp Act begun with a resolution stating that “the parliament of Great Britain had, hath and of right ought to have, full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and people of America Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain in all cases whatsoever” (Knollenberg 1975). This, in a sense, is Britain’s response to the intercolonial Stamp Act Congress’ petition. They denied the colonies petition stating they had no right to tax for revenue and responded with a statement giving them to right to tax the Americas for any reason. This declaration however, did not get by without opposition. Lord Camden, Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas opposed the resolution on the basis that it bound Parliament in no way to any constitutional limitations. While Lord Camden’s opposition was supported by a few, it wasn’t enough and the resolution for the repeal was passed is March of 1766 with a vote of 125 for it and only 5 against it.

A little over a Year after the repeal of the Stamp Act, Charles Townshend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, “Proposed to Parliament a series of acts that reignited the conflict” (Burg 2001). Just as things had begun to calm in the wake of the Stamp Act, the Townshend acts came through Parliament and again stirred the conflict. Townshend was not the originator of the ideas carried by the acts but was inspired by a previous movement lead by George Grenville. In January of 1767 the House of Commons was considering a substantial figure. It had been estimated that the cost to the British government to maintain British armed forces in the American colonies for one year amounted to over 400,000 pounds! Grenville brought up the idea of taxing the colonies to help pay this cost in his statement, “The troops to be kept up in America should be paid by the Colonies respectively for whose defense and benefit they were employed” (Knollenberg 1975). Interestingly, Grenville’s motion was defeated by a vote of 106 against it and only 35 for it. At this point Townshend enters the scene. Townshend had assumed leadership of the ministry in the absence of William Pitt and agreed with Grenville that the colonies should be paying for the protection provided them by the British army. He then proposed a bill “by which the Colonies should be taxed conformable to their abilities, in a manner that should be least burdensome and most efficacious. He had no thought, he added, of raising a sufficient revenue from the colonies immediately to cover all colonial expense, but would plan by degrees to form a revenue in time to bear the whole” (Knollenberg 1975). Townshend later elaborated on exactly how he planned to tax colonies. He planned to impose a duty on imports of raisins, oranges, lemons and olive oil, initiate a tax on port wine, and would allow the colonies to import directly from Portugal and Spain. In addition to these taxes he would “propose a reduction of the drawback (refund) of British duties allowed on reexportation to the colonies of several foreign products” (Knollenberg 1975). This reduction would consequentially lead to an increase in revenue produced by British import duties. Townshend estimated that these changes would produce for Britain between 30,000 and 40,000 pounds per year.

Townshend’s plan differed drastically from his original proposition. The 30 to 40,000 pound increase was nowhere close the original figure of 400,000 to pay for the troops, and the revenue earned from the duties would not help pay for troops but instead would be used to fund the salaries of civil officials in the colonies.

The plan which was finally proposed to the House of Commons would put into effect a duty on all grades of teas producing 20,000 pounds per year, and duties on paper, lead, paint, and glass producing 17,000 pounds per year. It was clear that the revenue generated by these duties would be used to make “a more certain and adequate Provision for the Charge of the Administration of Justice, and the support of Civil Government” (Knollenberg 1975). No funds would be dedicated to the support of British troops unless some were left over after paying the governmental bills. Townshend also proposed a suspension of the New York assembly due to their failure to comply with previous acts of the crown and proposed the creation of a board of customs commissioners to be headquartered in the colonies.

A bill which included Townshend’s plan quickly passed in June through the British government without any opposition and was scheduled to take effect on November 20^th, 1767. In addition to establishing the legislative arms which he had proposed Townshend had vice-admiralty courts set up in Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia and Charleston. The purpose of these courts was to process any violators of the new customs and taxes. “Customs commissioners proved overbearing and their agents rapacious, in effect harassing America merchants, often in hopes of obtaining unfavorable judgments and thus securing their share of forfeitures (one-third the value of each ship and its cargo” (Burg 2001). To make matters worse, these new courts operated without juries and were thus unsympathetic to defendants.

Surprisingly, attempts on the part of the colonists to prevent enforcement of the Townshend Act duties were moderate compared to the violence that occurred in response to the Stamp Act. In response the non-importation policy to boycott British goods was restored and colonial manufacturers were encouraged to produce the needed items. By the end of 1796 imports of British goods into the colonies had declined by almost 50%. Knollenberg argues that the lack of violent opposition stemmed from a “fear that opposition to the Townshend Acts was likely to get out of hand, as had the opposition to the Stamp Act. The frightening riots in New York, Boston, Newport, Philadelphia, and Charleston and the tenants’ uprising on the Hudson growing out of opposition to that act were still fresh in the minds of many” (Knollenberg 1975).

It wasn’t until the publication of the Farmer’s Letters that action against the Townshend Act was aroused. On December 2^nd, 1767 a series of twelve weekly letters, signed by A. Farmer, were published in the Pennsylvania Chronicle began. A. Farmer was later identified as John Dickinson. The Farmer’s letters were some of the most significant and influential writings in the period leading up to the Revolution. Dickinson argued the no difference existed between internal and external taxes when they were not purposed or imposed to regulate trade but to raise revenue. In one of his letters he reminds the people that the Stamp Act congress had denounced as unconstitutional any kind of tax imposed for the purpose of raising revenue levied by Parliament on the colonies.

It is at this point that we begin to focus on the implications of the events that have been presented thus far. What affect if any did the Stamp and Townshend acts have on the revolutionary mindset of the colonies?

A statement made by Egnal and Ernst brings us to the first point of analysis, “The struggles over the Currency Act, the Stamp Act, the Revenue Act, and the Townshend Acts in the I760’s reflected a strengthened commitment to economic autonomy” (Egnal and Ernst 1972). As the 13 colonies developed and matured, their economic independence became more and more significant. By the mid to late 18^th century the colonies had developed into an independent economic system that was fed by its mother country but was no longer dependant on her for sustainment. The colonial economy was flourishing in this time period as a result of a healthy trade market. Merchants were carrying massive amounts of goods to and from colonies from all over the world. Immigrants pouring into the new world also grew the economy as the number of consumer’s for both foreign and domestic goods increased and the labor force grew at a steady rate. As the colonies grew and prospered we begin to see the colonials referring to themselves as Americans and presenting a united front. Evidence of this is shown by the colonies formation of the Stamp Act Congress. In Burg’s account of the Stamp Act congress and their petition to Parliament he notes, “Although moderate, these resolutions, and the congress itself set a precedent for united action among the previously fractured colonies.” (Burg 2001) Although the petition of the Stamp Act Congress was ignored, and the repeal, including the statements giving Parliament the power to tax the colonies for any reason, was passed, the model of unification of the colonies was established. The colonies had united in their common interest to protect themselves from Britain.

A second point raises the question, “if these acts ignited the fires of revolution why did Britain continue to do so in an increasingly brutal way?” Knollenberg quoting Lord Lyttelton provides some insight to the answer, “Your Lordships have upon the present occasion your own constancy and dignity to maintain…When this great concession is we are, ‘tis said, to be firm in maintaining all the laws there, particularly those for regulating their commerce, which very laws…are the real ground of the present opposition…the repealing the law is such an encouragement to the plan of intimidation taken up by the Americans as may make them much more unreasonable in future demands. Their insolence will increase by concessions and where it will stop is not to be known.” (Knollenberg 1975) Lyttelton recognized that if Britain should continue to back down to the opposition emanating from the colonies they would only be encouraging further rebuttal to any enforcement of the British Parliament.

In considering these facts we are lead to consider the value of the colonies in the eyes of Britain. Britain had come to recognize that their primary source of power and economic significance originated from the colonies. As Hutson notes, the colonists had also come to this conclusion, “American’s agreed, then, that they were the source of Britain’s power and of her position in the European balance.” (Hutson 1980) It was necessary for Britain to gain control of the colonies in order to maintain their superiority and dominance over the rest of the world. As time progressed it became evident that Britain would stop at nothing to regain control on colonies that had begun to unify in their struggle for independence. Engnal and Ernst comment on the result and affect of British policies, “British measures threatened American liberty, leading colonists to react both to preserve their formal rights and to protect themselves against what they felt to be a genuine threat of British conspiracy, corruption, and enslavement” (Egnal and Ernst 1972). As Britain tightened their grasp on the colonies, the colonies only increased their struggle. Kaplan reinforces this idea in his statement, “British changes in the Navigation laws after 1763 matched by American reaction to those changes accounted for revolutionary sentiment” (Kaplan 1972).

The Townshend Acts are a good example of the attempt by the British Parliament to tighten their grasp on colonies. The duties placed on goods imported to the colonies did not represent this tightened grasp as much as the establishment of the Board of Customs Commissioners and vice-admiralty courts. These institutions materialized for the colonists their fears of oppression. The colonists had seen the fruition of their fears while at the same time Britain felt it was doing what was necessary to maintain control of their possession. Knollenberg illustrates the situation as Britain saw it by quoting Northington, “give up the law and Great Britain would be conquered in America and become a province to her own colonies. America must submit.” (Knollenberg 1975) It’s interesting to look at this struggle from both sides. On the side of Britain, they were doing everything in their power not to lose their most valuable asset; on the side of the colonists, their liberty was being threatened and they were not about to surrender it without a fight.

After considering the above facts and their repercussions it is safe to come to the conclusion that the acts of the British Parliament, specifically the Stamp and Townshend acts played a key role in igniting and inciting an attitude of resentment that ultimately led to the revolution of the thirteen colonies. They did not cause the Revolution in whole but did in part have a negative affect on the relationship between the mother country and her colonies which eventually culminated into the complete revolution and resulting independence of the United States of America.

Works Cited

Andrews, Charles. "The American Revolution: An Interpretation." The American Historical Review 31 (1926): 219-232. In JSTOR[database online]. (accessed May 16, 2009).

Burg, David F.. The American Revolution: Eyewitness History (Eyewitness History Series). New York: Facts on File, 2001.

Derry, John W.. English Politics and the American Revolution (Everyman's University Library). London: J.M.Dent & Sons Ltd, 1976.

Egnal, Marc , and Joseph Ernst. "An Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution." The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series 29 (1972): 4-32. In JSTOR[database online]. (accessed February 26, 2009).

Hutson, James H.. John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution. Lexington: Univ Pr of Kentucky, 1980.

Kaplan, Lawrence S.. Colonies into Nation: American Diplomacy, 1763-1801. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1972.

Knollenberg, Bernhard. Growth of the American Revolution: 1766-1775. New York City: Free Press, 1975.